A theory of joint-stock citizenship. And its consequences on the brain drain, sovereignty and state responsibility by Magni Berton, Raul
A theory of joint-stock citizenship. And its consequences
on the brain drain, sovereignty and state responsibility
Raul Magni Berton
To cite this version:
Raul Magni Berton. A theory of joint-stock citizenship. And its consequences on the brain
drain, sovereignty and state responsibility. 2013. <halshs-00911472>
HAL Id: halshs-00911472
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00911472
Submitted on 29 Nov 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sciences Po Grenoble  
working paper n.8 
 
 
 
A theory of joint-stock citizenship.  
And its consequences on the brain drain, sovereignty and 
state responsibility 
 
Raul Magni Berton, Univ. Grenoble-Alpes, Sciences Po Grenoble, PACTE 
 
 
    November 2013 
 
 
 
 
Partners // 
 
      
 2 
A theory of joint-stock citizenship.  
And its consequences on the brain drain, sovereignty and state responsibility 
 
Raul Magni-Berton,  
University of Grenoble (Sciences Po Grenoble), PACTE 
raul.magniberton@iepg.fr 
 
 
 
Abstract: Recent discussions about global justice have focused on the arguments in favor of 
including political and social rights within the set of human rights. In doing so, the issue of 
the existence of specific rights, enjoyed exclusively by citizens of a given community, is 
raised. This article deals with the problem of distinguishing human and citizen rights. It 
argues the existence of citizens’ rights based on specific solidarity in each country – the 
stockholder principle – that is compatible with a broad idea of human rights defined by 
international law and enforced according to the stakeholder principle. Moreover, the 
stockholder principle is compatible with the psychological concept of citizenship as based on 
a specific collective identity and, last but not least, it leads to fair consequences at a global 
level.  
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1. Introduction 
The French revolution was passed down an ambiguous legacy: the Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and Citizen. Who exactly is entitled to benefit from this package of rights: men (and, 
of course, women) or citizens? In the declaration, people are considered citizens in two 
articles concerning political and democratic decisions.  In the others articles, people are 
considered as men, or as persons. In more recent terms, whereas everyone enjoys civil rights, 
only citizens benefit from political rights. Little by little, social rights have also been included 
as human rights - in spite of some controversy still relevant today about “welfare 
chauvinism”.  So, political rights have been the last rights to be specifically reserved for 
citizens and they have been used to solve this demarcation problem: citizens differ from non-
citizens as they are entitled to participate in the government. This criterion is intimately linked 
with the idea of sovereignty: collective problems must be solved only by the members of the 
country – citizens – and by nobody else.  
This criterion, however, is sometimes challenged. Not only in ethics debates (see Beckman 
2006, Abizadeh 2008, Song 2009) but also in real policies. In New Zealand, permanent 
residents may vote, as well as fifteen-year residents in Uruguay. Several countries grant such 
a right at local elections, and more and more political manifestos mention this project 
(Bosniak 2006).  
The main argument in favor of entitling foreigners to vote is based on the idea that people 
should participate in the collective choices of the community in which they live, instead of in 
those in which they have legal citizenship, because only in the first case do they interact with 
the other people, producing and receiving positive or negative externalities and solidarity 
(Bauböck 2008, Shachar 2009). Focusing on democratic regimes, a coercive law is legitimate 
“only insofar as it is actually justified by and to the very people over whom it is exercised” 
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(Abizadeh 2008, 41). Thus, political rights should be given to each person who has some 
fundamental interests which are affected by the state’s policies (Song 2009).  
On the other hand, considering political rights as human rights, instead of citizen rights, 
implies an issue with the citizenship theory: what are the rights to be specifically enjoyed by 
citizens?  Should we give up the legal and moral relevance of citizenship as Spiro (2008) has 
suggested? Without citizenship, conceived as a set of special rights, many authors argue that 
there is no place for special communities able to govern themselves (Thaa 2001, Smith 2008). 
This article deals with this problem, and offers a theory of citizenship – called joint-stock 
citizenship – compatible both with citizenship-as-legal-status and with the widening of civic, 
political and social rights to non-citizens. Moreover, its ambition is to better bridge the gap 
between this legal status and the “citizenship-as-desirable-activity, where the extent and 
quality of one's citizenship is a function of one's participation in that community” (Kymlicka 
and Norman 1994, 353), able to offer a way to give “voice and agency” to cosmopolitan 
citizens, otherwise deprived of it (Thaa 2001, 520).  
The main element defining joint-stock citizenship is quite simple: citizens have specific duties 
towards their fellow-citizens because the latter have invested in them1. Therefore, full 
citizenship is defined by a great investment of the state in individuals’ life projects. Free 
education or free infrastructure, grants or loans are examples of investments in individuals’ 
success. Specific taxes – depending on an individual’s success - can be viewed as returns on 
investment for fellow-citizens. In order to present this concept, I proceed as follows.  In 
section 2, I introduce the problem of citizenship in globalized world, and I underscore merits 
and limits of the solution based on the stakeholder principle. In section 3, I present the core of 
                                                 
1
 This principle could be justified by appeal to the principle of fair play developed, for example, by Richard 
Dagger (1997). However, as I argue below, this can easily be justified with the idea a contractual arrangement 
between fellow citizens, under basic liberal rules. 
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the stockholder principle. Section 4 presents the concept of state responsibility which justifies 
the stockholder principle. In section 5, I analyze how the stockholder principle sheds new 
light on the discussion about the brain drain problem. Section 6 discusses the compatibility of 
the joint-stock citizenship with liberal rights.  Finally, in section 6 some specific legal 
consequences are investigated. 
 
2. The citizenship paradox and the stakeholder principle.  
A theory of citizenship must account for three key-facts: the existence of specific rights, the 
existence of specific duties (associated with those rights), and the attachment to a community 
which is, at least partly, a source of collective identity and of solidarity. The latter feature 
cannot be only a legal aspect, and implies a psychological dimension (Carens 2000, 166). This 
dimension is important as it favors high levels of cooperation among communities’ members, 
based on specific rights and duties. But, to promote such rights, the members of a community 
have to feel they are citizens and care about the other members. The link between legal status 
and the psychological dimension has to exist, in the form of incentives, obligations or social 
integration and whatever “draws a body of citizens together into a coherent and stably 
organized political community, and keeps that allegiance durable” (Beiner 1995,1). 
As I have pointed out, the current practice is generally based on political rights. Only the 
citizens can vote, hold political and administrative offices, serve on a jury and, more broadly, 
participate in collective decisions. They are, above all, political agents and their specific 
rights, duties, as well as their sense of belonging arise from that fact.  
However, political rights – conceived as specific citizens’ rights – are neither necessary nor 
sufficient to describe the aforementioned idea of citizenship. First, they are not necessary 
because political decisions concern not only citizens, but also a large set of resident and non 
resident people (Beckman 2006, Abizadeh 2008). Therefore, we cannot isolate citizens as the 
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only people concerned by political rights. Second, they are not sufficient because some 
choices, which are considered as non-political, can have a greater impact on the public sphere 
than many classic political decisions (Okin 1989,124-131), such as, for example, the family, 
child care and several other private actions that aim to care for fellow-citizens. So, there are 
no reasons to limit citizenship to political activities.  
This argument is particularly relevant in the current globalized context. As the number of 
immigrants increases, the percentage of residents entitled to vote decreases. Thus, current 
societies are moving away from universal suffrage, not because of restrictions in political 
rights, but because of a spectacular increase in cross-border mobility. In such a context, 
citizens – entitled to the right to vote – can make decisions knowing that other stakeholders 
cannot. 
If we extend the concept of political rights both to people greatly concerned by political 
decisions, and to civil care activities, we should conclude that every person who cooperates 
and interacts within the social network defined by the territorial law should be a citizen. This 
has led some scholars to advocate a “human right to citizenship”, based on the stakeholder 
principle (Bauböck 2008, 4)2. According to this, people should obtain the nationality of the 
country when they live in and have a permanent interest in their membership.  
Nevertheless, the stakeholder principle “must apply beyond the allocation of citizenship as a 
legal status” because “immigrants cannot be forced to become naturalized” (Bauböck 2008, 
6). This point is crucial because unlike the other human rights, the right to be a citizen is not 
obligatory because people have to remain free to choose to not be member of a community in 
which they live.  
In fact, the stakeholder principle is more relevant to define which country is responsible for 
guaranteeing human rights – including political rights – and corresponds to the “right to have 
                                                 
2
 A variant called “all affected interests principle” is provided by Goodin (2007). 
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rights” according to the Arendt definition of citizenship. But this remains an inadequate 
definition of citizenship. Humans have rights everywhere they live, regardless of their 
citizenship. Citizenship implies “specific” rights and duties which are not included in the list 
of “human rights”, and are associated only with the belonging to a community. As human 
rights must be considered obligatory duties towards human beings, the rights of citizens can 
be viewed as special duties reserved to people who belong to a specific community.  
 
3. Joint-stock citizenship and the stockholder principle 
To clarify what kind of rights or duties are implied in the citizen legal status, we need to have 
a clear claim about what rights are enjoyed in virtue of our personhood. It is possible to 
consider civic rights, political rights and minimal social rights as fundamental and granted for 
all. As I noted above, these rights are allocated to resident aliens in some countries, and this 
does not imply any obligation to deliver the status of citizen. Arguing that freedom of 
movement is a fundamental right (Carens 1987, Dumitru 2012 and article 13 (2) of the 
Universal declaration of human rights), the stakeholder principle can be used to identify 
which state has to guarantee these fundamental rights. However, enjoying these rights does 
not imply any kind of feelings of national identity or of solidarity. Fundamental rights should 
be guaranteed in international hotels, airports and in other stop-off points. If states accept to 
respect these rights, they also accept to value personhood, independently of citizenship.  
This claim engages us to assume two points: first, people and states have to provide basic 
respect (civic and political rights) and assistance (social rights) for everyone. Second, this 
respect and assistance cannot be a correct criterion to distinguish citizens from non-citizens.  
Thus, citizenship should imply more than people’s fundamental rights and duties: it should 
also imply some identity duties and specific rights resulting from solidarity that citizens have 
with each other.  
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These specific rights and duties are the core of the concept of joint-stock citizenship, 
according to which citizens have two features: first, they are like a joint-stock company in 
which fellow-citizens invest. For instance, children become citizens through public 
investments in free education or, more indirectly, in family policies. The consequence of these 
collective investments is a shared responsibility for individuals’ achievements: individual 
successes or failures are imputable partly to individual choices, partly to the collective 
investment. This is what differentiates citizens from non-citizens is this active community’s 
support for achieving their goals. This support justifies feelings of membership among the 
citizens, which can be associated with gratitude and solidarity, exactly as happens inside 
families, teams or among colleagues.  
On the other hand, the right to benefit from public support is associated with the duty to invest 
in the other fellow-citizens’ life projects. These duties are usually embodied in specific taxes 
for public investment. Thus, each citizen is also a stockholder with respect to other citizens.  
In liberal societies, each citizen could be considered as the main stockholder of their own life, 
and as a small-scale stockholder in fellow-citizens’ lives. Thus, individual freedom is 
protected and “the person whose life it is has primary and non delegatable responsibility for 
that success” (Dworkin 2000, 240). But, non-liberal citizenship could also be envisaged, 
based on the right for fellow citizens to interfere with individuals’ choices3. This possibility 
makes joint-stock citizenship compatible with liberal democracies, but conceptually 
independent.  
                                                 
3
 One difficulty with the non liberal view is that it in circumstances in which only one state wishes to invest in an 
individual, the state will be in the position of offering a ‘deal’ according to which it invests a small amount in the 
individual, but retains virtually all of the pay-out.  Given a lack of interest from elsewhere, it would be rational 
for individuals to consent to such offers.  Despite being consensual, it’s not clear that we would regard such 
deals as fair or rights-conferring.  The liberal principle according to which individuals are responsible to provide 
for themselves (they are the main stockholders of their own life), prevents this possibility.  
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4. Defining state responsibility 
When citizens invest in fellow-citizens’ achievement, through the tax and transfers 
mechanism, they become partly responsible for this achievement. This responsibility can be 
concretely conceptualized in three ways: 
In its first form, the state is thought of as a referee. It gives people rights, as medical care and 
education, and it is responsible only for that. In this case, the state is thought of as allocating 
rights so that nobody can complain about what she received. If these basic rights are properly 
distributed, the state is no longer responsible for people's condition. The state as referee 
comes from a liberal tradition which can be summarized as Constant (1819) did: "Let the 
holders of authority confine themselves to being just. We shall assume the responsibility of 
being happy for ourselves".   
The second concept of responsibility is illustrated by the example of banks. The state provides 
citizens with loans, but citizens have to pay them back. Public education loans are examples. 
In this case, the state invests in citizens, but it expects to recover its investment.  
The third concept is the state’s responsibility as a stockholder. Here, the state invests in 
citizens and the latter have to pay back according to their success in life. Thus, the state and 
individuals’ investments are evaluated ex post: when there is failure both are penalized, while 
in success both win. There are no clear examples of this mechanism, but the progressive 
nature of income tax can be justified in this way. The more people earn, the higher the share 
fellow-citizens will receive.  
The former two concepts subscribe to the idea that the state is responsible only for inputs, not 
for outputs and that only citizens are responsible for the consequences of their choices. The 
third concept does not separate individual and state achievement: everyone loses or wins, as in 
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a team. In such a way, the state undertakes a consequentialist choice: the quality of its 
investments in its citizens is partly captured by their effective achievement.  
Some liberal scholars have underlined the difficulty of identifying subjective achievement 
with objective measurement (Dworkin 2000). Presumably, measuring success with individual 
earnings is the most reliable technique because, all choices being equal, it indicates quite well 
the relative success in a given profession. Of course, some “successful lives” are compatible 
with low incomes. Let’s take, for instance, Van Gogh’s life: he preferred to paint high quality 
pictures rather than paintings that sold well. In his case, the community gave him excellent 
training – considering the output – but it got no taxes out of it. On the other hand, the 
community was not only responsible for Van Gogh’s training, but also for the economic 
success of his high quality pictures. And, for this second dimension, the collective 
performance was lower than Van Gogh’s. The accountability for Van Gogh’s pictures lack of 
commercial success does not reasonably lie only with the painter.  
This example illustrates why the stockholder’s responsibility is fair: when a failure occurs, the 
responsibility should not only be individual, but also collective. The state could be wrong in 
distributing opportunities, or in choosing how to invest. So, even when individuals assume 
most of the responsibility, fellow-citizens have to accept their fair share.  
Let’s analyze such concepts of responsibility in respect to individual rights. A person has the 
right to be respected even when she does not want to be a citizen in a given community. 
Tourists, not permanent residents or even permanent residents could refuse to weave special 
relationships with the people around them. Even in this case, they should keep human rights. 
Thus, the state in which they live has to be considered responsible for these rights as a referee: 
it fairly allocates and enforces fundamental rights. All residents – citizens or not – have to pay 
a territorial tax to finance the respect of fundamental rights inside their country.  
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However, when people are or become citizens, the stockholder principle is the most 
appropriate concept of responsibility. When people accept that fellow citizens invest in them, 
they also accept to share their achievements and failures with the community. They choose to 
belong to a specific community, and its loyalty does not depend on the territory in which they 
live, but on the reciprocal investment in the future.  
Moreover, sharing responsibilities implies taking care of individuals’ aims, which is a 
favorable ground for solidarity and common feelings among citizens.  
 
5. The “brain drain problem” and the Bhagwati Tax 
In this section, I discuss the brain drain problem, described as a collective action problem4. In 
a globalized word, with low mobility costs, countries (and firms) are in competition to attract 
high skilled workers. There is a trade-off between investing in high salaries to attract such 
workers and investing in education to train new high skilled people. The educational choice is 
both a long-run and uncertain investment. It is uncertain because the trained workers can 
decide to work in another country (or firm) that offers higher earnings. Is such a situation, the 
best strategy could be a non-cooperative one, i.e. consisting in increasing high-skill salaries 
and in decreasing spending on education. If states do not cooperate, they will tend to decrease 
spending on public education to finance high salaries. In doing so, global public education 
would be underprovided for5.  
                                                 
4
 In international organizations, the brain drain problem has often been conceptualized as a kind of exploitation 
of the poorest countries by richer countries. However, the existence of such a phenomenon has been reassessed 
by many scholars. See Kapur and Michale (2006).  
5
 This argument has been sometimes challenged. Emigration of highly skilled persons can under certain 
conditions lead to individual investment into education and training among those remaining in the state of origin. 
See Stark (2004).  
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Regarding public education as citizens’ investments in their fellow-citizens, its under-
provision means citizens’ lower ability to invest in fellow-citizens’ projects.   Moreover, each 
citizen who finances public education is exploited by high-skilled fellow citizens that leave 
the country, because she or he does not see any return on investment. Inversely, new citizens 
and immigrants are exploited by the new community in which they live, because they pay 
taxes for services that they did not receive.  
This fact is an instance of the tension between the state’s accountability to its citizens and the 
state as a territorial jurisdiction (Bauböck 2008). Nevertheless, a “duty of sedentarism” would 
infringe on the fundamental right to free movement and could be particularly unfair in terms 
of equal opportunities (Dumitru 2012).  
Joint-stock citizenship provides a way to solve this issue. When people move across countries, 
they do not lose their citizenship, or the specific duties and rights attached to it. Particularly, 
they have to respect the agreement between them and their fellow-citizens, as a state. The 
state keeps being their stockholder as a consensual agreement has been concluded.  
So, concerning the fellow-citizens’ stock dividends, the agreement does not change if citizens 
change the country in which they work. In any case, the agreement signed between the state 
and the citizen continues to be binding, exactly as happens when people invest in a joint-stock 
company.  In such a perspective, international mobility for fellow-citizens could even be 
encouraged if states consider that this enhances the expected success of their citizens.  
Of course, these dividends should be proportional to the past public investments and to the 
actual financial success of the citizen. If a citizen did not benefit from state school, or, more 
generally, from public services, there is no reason to share the responsibility of their potential 
achievement. For instance, a state cannot demand the same taxation for foreign residents as 
for citizens, because the state has not invested in them. Assuming they have not benefited 
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from any public investment, they should only pay the tax necessary to guarantee their 
fundamental rights inside the country.   
In short, this system applies the same tax regime to all citizens, according to the degree of 
public investment in them6, and regardless of where they live.  This tax-system gives the state 
an incentive to provide education and to invest in fellow-citizens, contrary to what currently 
happens in most countries.  Moreover, it offers states an incentive to be efficient in helping 
citizens to develop their life project, even when it implies a cross border movement. 
This last feature points out some similarities and differences with the Bhagwati arguments in 
favor of a specific tax for people who emigrate. According to Bhagwati, emigrants have to 
compensate fellow-citizens for what they could have contributed if they had chosen to remain. 
Indeed, “the diaspora approach is incomplete unless the benefits are balanced by some 
obligations, such as the taxation of citizens living abroad” (Bhagwati 2004, 215).  This 
Bhagwati tax supposes a duty based on the fellow-citizens’ past investment, which is coherent 
with the joint-stock citizenship. But it supposes that emigration is a regrettable event which 
people should compensate for with a specific tax. In citizen-based taxation justified by joint-
stock citizenship, there is no difference between migrants and sedentary people, and 
emigration could be, in some circumstances, even encouraged.  
Both forms of this citizenship-based taxation already exist. The U.S. taxes its citizens abroad 
on their worldwide income in a similar way to that described here, whereas Eritrea imposes a 
special 2% tax on all Eritreans living abroad, in line with the Bhagwati tax.  
In spite of some criticism, recent articles argue in favor of levying the tax on the basis of 
citizenship, particularly in a globalized world (Kirsch 2007, Zelinsky 2010). The existence of 
tax treaties and of international law facilitates the enforcement of such a law. Twenty years 
                                                 
6
 This statement suggests that there may be several degrees of citizenship. This point will be developed in section 
6. For arguments along these lines, see Beckman (2006).  
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ago, the Philippines turned out to be unsuccessful in enforcing its tax on emigrants (Pomp 
1989) that led it to get rid of citizenship-based taxation in 1997. But the exchange of 
information is easier than before, thanks to the development of Tax Information Exchange 
Agreements (TIEAs). Also, international law allows the implementation of national laws 
through foreign jurisdictions. Plus, when two countries have a citizen-based taxation, they can 
implement it with mutual-agreement procedures for tax treaties.  
These international devices tend to increase countries’ fiscal control, even outside their 
borders.  
Let’s suppose now that a state invests in a foreign citizen. For instance, this foreign citizen 
obtains the right to go to medical school for free, in exchange for an obligatory tax whose 
level depends on the economic achievement of that person. As the citizens have invested in 
this foreign citizen, the latter can claim citizenship. But, he retains the possibility to not 
become a new citizen of the country which has invested in him or her. In this case, we can 
consider such a deal as an agreement between a state and a foreign private person, defined by 
the Institute of International Law, at the Session of Athens of 1979. Thus, the stockholder 
principle can also be regarded as a private agreement which includes citizen’s rights, without 
identity feelings. But even in this case, such an agreement brings about a special relation 
between a person and a given community, which looks like the citizenship concept.  
Such juridical tools tend to prove that globalization trends “strengthen, rather than weaken, 
the case for taxing the income of citizens abroad, regardless of whether the income is earned 
from working or arises from investments” (Kirsch 2007, 448).  
This possibility of setting up such taxes gives citizens the real alternative of being able to 
invest in fellow-citizens thanks to the real chance of recovering their investment. Plausibly, 
this could solve the brain drain problem and the increasing trend of underproviding for public 
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education. In the next section, I shall advocate why this investment is more than a practical 
solution and could be identified as the central point for understanding citizenship.  
 
6. Community belonging and liberal rights  
As with several theories of citizenship, joint-stock citizenship could be considered as an 
agreement between a person and a community, if people were always responsible for their 
actions. The example of the naturalization of residents is typically easy to solve because they 
choose to accept or refuse the terms of the agreement. But a state does not wait for citizens to 
come of age to invest in them. The investment in children may be regarded as the most 
relevant feature of a community. Since children are not responsible for such an investment, it 
could be unfair that fellow citizens force people to respect the agreements that were 
contracted in their childhood.  
According to joint-stock citizenship, children reach citizenship when fellow citizens invest in 
them. Their parents can refuse this collective investment, but if they accept, they also engage 
their children. Fellow citizens would then be stockholders of the children’s future career, and 
they should invest in these opportunities efficiently. That is why citizenship differs from a 
club membership: children have been included in the community and are partly committed 
alongside people who they have not consensually and responsibly chosen. 
This constraint can be viewed as incompatible with basic liberal claims, according to which, 
nobody should be chained to a community. The right to emigrate7, for example, has been 
designed to prevent communities from forcing people to be included (Whelan 1981, 638)8.   
Obviously, joint-stock citizenship implies a kind of not fully consensual agreement between 
individuals and their community. However, it can be considered compatible with liberal 
                                                 
7
 Article 13 of the Universal declaration of human rights.  
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principles for three reasons based, respectively, on the individual, the family and the global 
point of view. But beforehand, two kinds of “chains” should be distinguished: the “hard 
chains”, clearly incompatible with liberal principles, and the “soft chains” which can be 
spotted in liberal societies.  
Chains are hard when they prevent people from choosing another community they wish to 
belong to. In this respect, the stockholder principle is acceptable because it admits the 
possibility of changing community and identity.  
On the other hand, chains are soft when they prevent people from cutting ties with their past 
community. Everyone has soft chains: their education, knowledge, language, and 
relationships and, generally, family and public choices are examples of legacy from our first 
community. People can try to change community, but they remain actually partly linked to 
their origins. The stockholder principle, in taxing people for past investments their community 
made in them, offers a similar legacy. The main difference, however, is that this legacy is 
fixed by law.  
It is possible to conceptualize this difference otherwise. Several soft chains, like a mother 
tongue, is due to what a community – or a family - did not do for its members. For instance, if 
people do not learn English or Chinese during their youth in their first community, they will 
remain more attached to their linguistic community and they lack opportunity to change 
community in a globalized world. On the contrary, the soft chain implied in the stockholder 
principle can be described as a consequence of what a community and a family did for its 
members. The community spends resources on increasing citizens’ skills and on broadening 
their choices, but those resources imply a specific taxation-repayment. Similar policies can 
currently be observed in liberal democracies. Public education loans, for instance, have to 
been paid back even if the payee lives and works in another country.  
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The main concern, with joint-stock citizenship, is the introduction of legal ties contracted in 
individuals’ childhood. But what would children have chosen if they had been adults – or, 
say, under a veil of ignorance? Considering they will pay back only if they are economically 
successful, it is rational for them to increase their opportunities by contracting a debt with 
their community rather than receiving only what the universal rights of children and the 
willingness of their family can provide them. At worst, this choice is reasonable enough to 
justify allowing states to offer their citizens this possibility.  
Let’s see this issue, now, from the family point of view. According to the stockholder 
principle, the state cannot invest in children without the families’ consent. Parents can request 
the state invests in their children but they can also refuse, and take on the costs of education 
themselves. Parents’ choices already have a considerable impact on their children’s tastes and 
opportunities. Suppose they discover in a child a great talent and taste for playing the trumpet, 
but they do not have enough money to pay for the lessons. Should they be able to pay for the 
lessons with the money earned during their child’s future career? If we consider our society as 
being based on families’ educational choices, we should allow this possibility, because it 
increases the opportunities that children can receive from their parents. As liberal societies are 
based on the autonomy of the family (Fishkin 1983), they must give families the right to 
paternalistically engage their children, to improve their well-being, as they already do in 
several fields.  
To sum up, while joint-stock citizenship partly chains people to their country, those chains are 
soft, reasonable for the individuals and approved of by the families. The stockholder principle 
is thereby compatible with liberal principles. Assuming that, there is a third reason to adopt it, 
based on utilitarian arguments.  
If all collective agreements with people under 18 are void, communities are deterred from 
investing in their members under 18, because the latter are free to not respect the terms of the 
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agreement. Thus, banks do not lend, schools do not loan and so on. This is a paradox of our 
societies, because youth is an ideal and efficient age for investments. On the other hand, 
people should be free to choose what investments they wish to receive and children are not 
considered really free to make such a choice. The non-democratic effect of generalizing 
specific training for children – compared to providing a broad-based education – leads to 
reducing people’s opportunities.  
This dilemma is solved if people remain free to not comply with those investments. Suppose 
the community and the family invest in trumpet lessons for their daughter, but the latter 
decides to be a carpenter. In this case, whatever her earnings are, she will not refund this 
training, because, it can reasonable be assumed, it has not influenced her career. To avoid 
such risks, the community has an incentive to provide a broad-based education able to open 
up the child’s future career, except when specific talents and motivations clearly appear.  
Given this common incentive to invest in youth, the stockholder principle maximizes the 
provision of skilled young people as well as the principle of opening up careers to talents.  
Notice, nevertheless, that all social rights are not justified by the stockholder principle. The 
latter, as I said above, exclusively concerns the citizens’ rights as sorts of supererogatory 
rights. This point will be developed in the next section.  
 
7. Comparing stockholder and stakeholder principles.  
I have opposed two principles used to define rights and duties in a society. The stakeholder 
principle is responsible for the enforcement of human rights. The stockholder principle 
governs specific kinds of solidarity which are adopted in a given society, in addition to and 
compatibly with human rights. Thus, I have advocated that stockholder and stakeholder 
principles are compatible. To discuss this compatibility, four main concrete issues are 
analyzed. First, how should the tax system work? Second, how can people acquire 
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citizenship? Third, who decides what public funds are invested in? Fourth, what about 
multiple citizenship?  
First of all, not all taxes should depend on citizenship, because they are not based on the 
collective investment that defines the stockholder principle. Some taxes are not used to invest 
in people, but to assure the functioning of the actual rights, such as security, property, the 
right to a fair trial, to social security etc. In other words, some taxes aim to provide each 
human being with rights and depend on the territory in which people live, regardless of their 
nationality. This tax regime and these rights are based on the stakeholder principle because 
they concern all people who live in a given community, and are applied to citizens as well as 
non-citizens9.  
The enforcement of human rights has to be assured by the territorial law which individuals are 
governed by and, therefore, the cost of such an implementation is also paid by residents and, 
generally, by people who live in a given jurisdiction. However, the obligation for each 
country to deliver such rights does not imply that they are the only rights that a country can 
enforce.  
Other special rights can be delivered in a community in which there is specific solidarity and 
feelings of identity. This community can produce high levels of cooperation based on specific 
rights and duties among its members. But, to promote such rights, the members of such a 
community have to feel like citizens, i.e. take care of their fellow citizens and share their 
                                                 
9
 This point is confirmed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which says “Everyone is entitled to all 
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the 
country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any 
other limitation of sovereignty” (Art. 2).  
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achievement as well as their failure. I have advocated that the stockholder principle efficiently 
and fairly allows the enforcement of such rights.  
In such a perspective, the tax system should be separated into two different services. On the 
one hand, human rights enforcement follows the stakeholder principle: every person who 
cooperates and interacts within the social network defined by the territorial law has to 
contribute to the enforcement of civic, political and social rights conceived as human rights.  
On the other hand, citizens’ rights are enforced by the stockholder principle. Every person 
who benefits or has benefited from a special investment from a community has a legal status 
of citizen, and pays taxes to invest in fellow-citizens regardless of where she or he lives.  
This double tax-system, based on different requirements, implies that it is possible for people 
to pay taxes in two different countries. But this does not imply a double taxation, because the 
stakeholder and the stockholder principle clearly define the amount of tax that each state may 
claim. Current multilateral tax treaties are an institution capable of solving international 
disputes through the aforementioned principles.  
The second issue is how people should acquire citizenship. According to the stockholder 
principle, every person who wishes to invest in citizens belonging to a given community or in 
whom the community invests is entitled to be a citizen. The rules of such an investment are 
fixed by the community. Notice that neither the birth place, nor the nationality of the family, 
nor where they live are relevant to acquire joint-stock citizenship. Theoretically, the 
community’s investment in individuals should depend only on the willingness of those 
individuals or their families. But the possibility that a community restricts the conditions to be 
eligible for receiving such investments cannot be excluded.  
Third, in order to choose which rules govern the level of specific investments and repayments, 
a fundamental issue is fixing who decides. Again, citizens’ rights must be ruled by 
stockholders, exactly as decisions concerning human rights must be ruled by stakeholders. In 
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this perspective, citizens retain some very specific political rights essentially centered on the 
regulation of individual and firm subsidies, methods of funding and terms of repayment 
agreements. Restricted referenda or assemblies could be set up to rule those specific issues.  
Fourth, is joint-stock citizenship compatible with double citizenship? The answer is yes if this 
means belonging to several communities. But, it is no if it involves being a full citizen in 
several communities. Let’s go over the “joint-stock” metaphor one more time. A stock-joint 
company can be owned by citizens from two or more countries. Similarly, a joint-stock 
citizen can receive several investments from several countries. For example, a person, say 
Sandra, has received a high level training in her youth in the country A, then public university 
loans in country B and finally, her firm is subsidized by a country C. Sandra can then obtain 
three nationalities, but she is only partially a citizen of each community. In the country A, she 
pays back only for the investment in her youth, and her participation in political decisions is 
restricted to this issue. And so on for countries B and C. More precisely, each community 
gives her a set of duties and rights, but they are not cumulative. This solution allows the 
promotion of the right to belong to several communities, while it avoids transforming it into a 
privilege.  
These subjects are a sample of the main issues which could be discussed. Of course, the aim 
here is not to cover the question in its entirety, but only to suggest some concrete rules which 
allow us to see how joint-stock citizenship can concretely work.  
 
8. Conclusion 
The theory of joint-stock citizenship aims to provide a concept of citizenship that protects the 
psychological needs and the material advantages of belonging to a specific community, in a 
way that is compatible with the free movement principle and with a widening of human and 
political rights.  
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Of course, “compatible” has to be understood as “as compatible as possible”. As Pevnik 
(2011, 116-117) wrote “Because equality of opportunity and self-determination conflict with 
one another, insisting on wholehearted support for both is platitudinous”. Indubitably, joint-
stock citizenship does not eliminate this conflict. However, it offers a fair compromise by 
accepting to slightly reduce both equality of opportunity and self-determination. Indeed, by 
keeping a kind of self-determination, it creates an incentive for communities to increase the 
opportunities of their members and, at global level, increase the opportunities for people as a 
whole. On the other hand, it offers a way to maximize free movement and individuals’ 
opportunities without depriving people of their need to belong to a community that takes care 
of them.  
Finally, two general issues can be further discussed. The first is the question of who has a 
claim to citizenship status. According to the stockholder principle, benefiting from free special 
investment is sufficient to determine who the citizens are. The question can be addressed with 
regards to who decides who benefits from these investments. No univocal answer is provided in 
this article, but it can be reasonably argued that whoever desires to benefit from social 
investment can do it. Contrary to other theories of citizenship – and to the current situation - the 
joint-stock approach implies strong duties based on a specific taxation. Therefore, demand for 
citizenship of countries such as the U.S. or the European countries will probably decrease. In its 
current form, citizenship implies essentially advantages, so that demand for citizenship, 
especially in developed countries, is too high to be supplied for all the applicants.  
The second issue is about the voluntary renunciation of citizenship by those who reside 
permanently abroad. Since citizens retain a life-long obligation to pay back for the investment 
their country of origin has made into them, they cannot remain entirely free to renounce their 
citizenship. I already discussed the compatibility with liberal principles of this claim. People 
are free to acquire a new citizenship and to renounce every future investment from their 
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former community. But they cannot freely break the past agreement, if it has been contracted 
under fair conditions. After all, this is true for all kinds of agreements and it remains unclear 
why this should be different for citizenship.  
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